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1. Introduction  
The pain-in-mouth argument, due to Block (1983), presents a puzzle about pain. Consider 
the following inference:  
There is a pain in my fingertip.  
The fingertip is in my mouth.  
Therefore, there is a pain in my mouth.  
Intuitively, the argument is invalid, but philosophers disagree over what precisely explains 
the intuitive invalidity at issue, and furthermore, they often take their proposals to support 
different philosophical theories of pain.  
Tye (1995, 2002, 2005) contends that the argument is invalid because ‘pain’ creates 
an intensional context. He takes his proposal to support representationalism about pain, 
according to which pain experiences represent tissue damage. Noordhof (2001, 2002, 2005), 
agreeing with Block (1983), thinks that the ‘in’ of ‘pain in X’ is non-spatial and the phrase 
should be understood as describing X as being in a particular state.  
In a recent paper (2019), appealing to empirical results, Reuter, Sienhold and 
Sytsma (RSS henceforth) argue against these two existing proposals and put forward an 
implicature account. They contend that the conclusion in the argument carries the 
conversational implicature that there is something wrong with the speaker’s mouth. But the 
premises don’t carry this implicature. This explains why we have the intuition that the 
argument fails, though the argument, on this proposal, is strictly speaking valid. RRS (2019: 
 81) take their proposal to support the bodily view of pain, according to which pains are 
states of the body, not states of the mind (see Reuter & Sytsma 2018). 
This paper argues against the implicature account. It offers two arguments – one 
theoretical and one empirical – against the proposal (section 2). Drawing on further 
empirical evidence, it shows that pain reports using locative locutions, e.g. ‘there is a pain 
in my mouth’, are intuitively understood by ordinary English speakers as entailing 
corresponding predicative locutions, e.g. ‘my mouth hurts’. The paper thus vindicates a 
rather simple and unsurprising solution to the pain-in-mouth puzzle: the entailment account, 
according to which the argument seems invalid because the conclusion is understood as 
entailing something that cannot be inferred from the premises (section 3). The 
philosophical implications of this proposed solution are also drawn (section 4).   
 
2. Against the Implicature Account  
RSS (2019: 74) model the pain-in-mouth argument on the following kinds of arguments:  
There is tissue damage in my finger.  
The finger is in my mouth.  
Therefore, there is tissue damage in my mouth.  
There is an inflammation in my finger.  
The finger is in my mouth.  
Therefore, there is an inflammation in my mouth.  
Like the pain-in-mouth argument, the above arguments also seem invalid. RSS’s (ibid.) 
explanation for the intuitive invalidity of these arguments crucially lies with their claim 
 that the following utterances, ‘in most conversational settings’, carry the conversational 
implicature that there is something wrong with the speaker’s mouth: 
There is a pain in my mouth.  
There is tissue damage in my mouth.  
There is an inflammation in my mouth.  
According to RSS (ibid.), we are inclined to judge that the above arguments fail because 
their conclusions all carry the generalised conversational implicature ‘that something is wrong 
with the speaker’s mouth, while the premises carry no such implicature’. However, RSS’s 
proposal fails to provide a full explanation for the intuitive invalidity of these arguments.  
A generalised conversational implicature is carried by an utterance of a proposition 
in most ordinary contexts of utterance (Blome-Tillman 2013: 178). Consider the following 
two well-known examples of generalised conversational implicatures from Grice (1975: 56):  
(a) ‘I went to a college yesterday.’  
(b)  ‘I’m meeting a woman for dinner tonight.’  
In most ordinary contexts, (a) carries the implicature that the college I went to is not mine; 
(b) carries the implicature that the woman is not my wife. Now consider the following 
arguments:  
[A1] 
I went somewhere yesterday.  
This somewhere is a college. 
I went to a college yesterday.  
[A2] 
Someone is meeting a woman for dinner tonight.  
 This someone is I.  
I am meeting a woman for dinner tonight.  
In both arguments, it seems that the conclusion carries a generalised conversational 
implicature which is not carried by the premises. Regarding [A1], we can easily imagine 
ordinary conversational contexts where a subject, say, upon being asked whether she was 
home yesterday, replies naturally with ‘I went somewhere yesterday’, which does not 
implicate that the place the speaker went to was not her college. Similarly, regarding [A2], 
there seem to be ordinary contexts where the utterance of ‘Someone is meeting a woman 
for dinner tonight’ does not carry the conversational implicature generally associated with 
the conclusion. Such a context could be one where the gender of the person (in this case, 
woman) or the purpose of the meeting (for dinner) or the time of the meeting (tonight) is 
contextually salient. Regarding the first option, for instance, upon seeing a lone woman 
sitting at a table for two in a restaurant typically full of men, one waiter says to another: ‘It 
looks like someone is meeting a woman for dinner tonight’, which does not implicate that 
the woman is not this someone’s wife.  
RSS explain the intuitive invalidity of the pain-in-mouth argument in terms of a 
generalised conversational implicature carried by the conclusion but not carried by the 
premises. [A1] and [A2] are like the pain-in-mouth argument in this respect. However, we 
do not judge them to be invalid nor do we find the conclusions misleading. More generally, 
just because the conclusion of an argument carries a certain generalised conversational 
implicature which is not carried by the premises, it does not follow that we find the 
argument intuitively invalid. So, RSS’s account, as it stands, cannot adequately explain the 
intuitive invalidity of the pain-in-mouth argument.  
  Furthermore, RSS’s claim that utterances such as ‘there is a pain/tissue damage/an 
inflammation in my mouth’ carry the conversational implicature that ‘there is something 
wrong with my mouth’ is questionable. Conversational implicatures are usually thought 
of as explicitly cancellable (Grice 1975: 44; Blome-Tillman 2008, 2013). If utterance ‘P’ merely 
conversationally implicates Q, then the utterance ‘P, (but) not Q’ is admissible or at least 
not outright contradictory. This is known as ‘the cancellability test’. Consider the following 
example from Blome-Tillman (2013):  
A: Are you going to the party tonight?  
B: I don’t like parties.  
B’s utterance carries the conversational implicature that B won’t go to the party tonight. But 
this implicature is explicitly cancellable. B would not be contradicting herself if she uttered 
the following:  
(1) I don’t like parties, but I’ll go to this one anyway.  
Generalised conversational implicatures like ‘I’m meeting a woman for dinner tonight’ also 
pass the cancellability test. The following utterance is admissible:  
(2) I’m meeting a woman for dinner tonight. It’s my wife.  
The cancellability test helps to distinguish conversational implicatures from semantic 
entailments. Semantic entailments fail to cancel (Blome-Tillman 2013: 172):  
(3) #Elliot is a bachelor (i.e. a single man), but he is married. 
(4) #The general killed himself, but he was not dead.  
Given the standard cancellability test, and given RRS’s implicature account, namely 
that utterances like ‘there is a pain/tissue damage/an inflammation in my mouth’ carry the 
 conversational implicature that ‘there is something wrong with my mouth’, the following 
sentences should be admissible: 
(5) There is a pain in my mouth, but there is nothing wrong with my 
mouth.  
(6) There is tissue damage in my mouth, but there is nothing wrong 
with my mouth.  
(7) There is an inflammation in my mouth, but there is nothing wrong 
with my mouth.  
Two observations are to be made here. First, (6) and (7) do not sound admissible at first 
pass, or at least do not sound as admissible as (1) and (2), which are cancellable 
conversational implicatures. Second, (5) may or may not sound inadmissible depending 
on whether one is aware of cases of referred pains, where pains are perceived in locations 
which are not the source of the painful stimuli.1  
 
1 According to RSS’s study, participants showed an increase in approval of the conclusions of the 
pain-in-mouth argument, and corresponding arguments featuring ‘tissue damage’ and 
‘inflammation’, upon being prompted to ignore the misleadingness of relevant conclusions and 
rate whether they ‘technically speaking’ follow from the premises. RSS take this to show that the 
relevant implicature is cancellable to some extent. However, the increase is small (see 2019: 80-1). 
For instance, the average rating for the acceptability of the conclusion in the pain-in-mouth 
argument after the prompt still falls short of the midpoint (increased from M=2.10 to M=3.79). (RSS 
used a seven-point Likert scale, where 1 is ‘Strongly Disagree’, 7 is ‘Strongly Agree’, and 4 is 
‘Neither Agree nor Disagree’.) One might wonder whether the increase is simply due to other 
factors, e.g. demand characteristics, rather than the cancellability of the implicature.  
 To test these two observations, experimental data were collected from 121 
participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants were first given the following 
vignette:  
In this task, you will be asked to judge whether some sentences make 
sense or not. You are asked to pay attention to the content of the sentence, 
i.e. what the sentence says.  
In order to understand the task, please read the following example: 
Consider the sentence: 'The tabletop is rectangular, but it has three sides'. 
The sentence doesn't make sense at all. It expresses a contradiction, 
because something cannot be rectangular while having three sides at the 
same time. 
Participants were then asked to rate whether sentences (1)-(7) make sense.2 The sentences 
were randomly ordered. A 7-point Likert scale was used where ‘1’ means ‘The sentence 
makes perfect sense’ and ‘7’ means ‘The sentence makes no sense at all’.  
Results were compared across three groups: cancellable conversational implicatures, 
i.e. (1) and (2); contradictions, i.e. (3) and (4); and bodily conditions, i.e. (5)-(7). Most 
participants gave low ratings to (1) (M=1.76, SD=1.29) and (2) (M=1.43, SD=0.97). Most 
participants gave high ratings to the two instances of contradictions, i.e. (3) (M=6.75, 
SD=0.99) and (4) (M = 6.85, SD=0.72), as well as the three cases of bodily conditions, i.e. (5) 
(M=5.45, SD=1.85), (6) (M=6.19, SD=1.48), and (7) (M = 6.13, SD=1.45).  
 
2 Participants were 62.5% women and 100% native speakers of English with an average formal 
education of 15.6 years.  
 Results showed that participants did not treat the three sentences about bodily 
conditions like cancellable conversational implicatures. 3  The results are presented as 
Figure 1 below.  
 
 
3 The ratings for each of the three groups were averaged first. A pairwise comparison showed 
significant differences between the average ratings of bodily conditions and cancellable 
conversational implicatures [t(87)=25.28, p<0.001]. The comparison between the average ratings 
for bodily conditions versus contradictions had a smaller effect size [Cohen’s d=0.86], whereas the 
comparison between the average ratings for bodily conditions versus cancellable conversational 
implicatures had a larger effect size [Cohen’s d=3.87].  
  To ensure statistical differences did not arise due to the different number of items in each 
category, results were also compared between the average ratings of the 2 sentences in the 
cancellable conversational implicatures category (1&2) and subsets of 2 sentences in the bodily 
conditions category. Three pairwise comparisons showed significant differences between the 
average ratings of cancellable conversational implicatures (1&2) and the average ratings of bodily 
conditions [5&6: t(87)=23.23, p<0.001; 5&7: t(87)=22.20, p<0.001; 6&7: t(87)=28.03, p<0.001].  
 Results also showed that the average rating of (5) was lower than those of (6) and 
(7) ((5): M=5.45, SD=1.85; (6): M=6.19, SD=1.48, and (7): M = 6.13, SD=1.45).4 Participants 
were asked to specify their reasons for their ratings of (5), and were given three options: (a) 
‘I thought if someone has a pain in his/her mouth, then there must be something wrong with the 
person's mouth’; (b) ‘I am aware of cases of referred pains, where one can have a pain in one part of 
the body but there is nothing wrong with that body part’; (c) Other. Further examination of the 
participants' ratings revealed that the lower average rating for (5) was driven by 
participants whose reasoning aligned with choice (b). Specifically, participants who chose 
(b) had an average rating of 3.94 (SD=1.91), whereas participants who chose (a) and (c) had 
average ratings of 6.39 (SD=1.00) and 6.67 (SD=0.58) respectively. The breakdown of the 
participants who chose (a), (b) and (c) was 58.0%, 38.6%% and 3.4% respectively. 
It should be noted that although (6) and (7) received high average ratings, results 
did not show that participants treated them like semantic contradictions such as (3) and 
(4).5 A plausible explanation, as noted in one participant’s feedback, is that the utterance 
‘there is something wrong with my mouth’ might indicate a level of severity. A subject can 
have a pain/an inflammation/tissue damage in the mouth, while insisting that there is 
nothing wrong with her mouth, meaning that there is nothing serious or nothing to worry 
 
4 A pairwise comparison showed significant differences between the ratings of (5) and (6) [t(87)=3.73, 
p<0.001], and between the ratings of (5) and (7) [t(87)=4.26, p<0.001]. A pairwise comparison 
showed no significant difference between the ratings of (6) and (7) [t(87)=0.44, p=0.66].  
5 A pairwise comparison did show significant differences between average ratings of (6) and (7) on 
the one hand and contradictions on the other [t(87)=4.66, p<0.001].  
 about regarding her mouth. It could also be that not everyone associates pains/tissue 
damage/inflammations with negative valence.  
But that (5)-(7) were not treated like typical cases of semantic contradictions is not 
evidence that they involve conversational implicatures. On the contrary, the empirical data 
suggest the opposite. Given RSS’s implicature account, one would naturally expect (5)-(7) 
to be judged as similar to (1) and (2), rather than (3) and (4). However, this was not the case. 
RSS might insist that conversational implicatures are cancellable to different extents and 
some are very hard to cancel. But this is not an adequate response. The burden is on RSS 
to explain why (5)-(7), supposing they involve conversational implicatures, are so hard to 
cancel. In other words, RSS must explain why they are special such that they were judged 
to be nothing like standard cases of cancellable conversational implicatures but more like 
contradictions.  
 
3. The Entailment Account 
What then explains the intuitive failure of the pain-in-mouth argument? In their recent 
paper, Liu and Klein (2019) draw attention to the distinction between two distinct kinds of 
pain reports in English: (i) the locative locution, e.g. ‘there is a pain in my back’, which at the 
level of surface grammar describes pains as things located in body parts;6 and (ii) the 
predicative locution, e.g. ‘my back hurts’, whose surface grammar attributes a state to a body 
part. A number of philosophers have previously suggested that the two kinds of pain 
reports are closely related (Hyman 2003; Bain 2007). A plausible explanation for the pain-
 
6 Liu and Klein note four features of the locative locution: ‘pain’ takes the prepositional phrase ‘in 
NP’; is countable; permits an existential construction and also a possessive construction.   
 in-mouth puzzle is the following: in English, pain reports using locative locutions are 
intuitively understood as entailing corresponding predicative locutions – the conclusion of 
the pain-in-mouth argument, i.e. ‘there is a pain in my mouth’, entails that ‘my mouth 
hurts’. This consequence should also be entailed by the premises. But it is not. So, the 
conclusion of the argument does not follow from the premises, and the pain-in-mouth 
argument is intuitively judged to be invalid. Call this ‘the entailment account’.  
 To empirically test this hypothesis, the same participants were asked to rate, again 
on the scale of 1-7, whether the following two sentences make sense:  
(8) There is a pain in my mouth, but my mouth doesn’t hurt.  
(9) My mouth hurts, but there is no pain in my mouth.  
Participants were then explicitly asked whether the following two sentences mean the 
same thing:  
(10) There is a pain in my mouth.  
(11) My mouth hurts.   
 Results showed that the average ratings for (8) and (9) were 6.76 (SD=0.86) and 6.67 
(SD=0.81) respectively, and that participants treated (8) and (9) just like the two cases of 
semantic contradictions, i.e. (3) and (4).7 The results are summarised in Figure 2:  
 
7 ANOVA yielded no significant difference among (3), (4), (8) and (9) [F(3, 348)=0.68, p=0.58]. The 
two one-sided sample tests (TOST) procedure (Lakens 2017) showed statistical equivalence 
between the average ratings for contradictions and ratings for (8) [ΔL=-0.20, ΔU=0.28, t(174)=-82.44, 
p<0.001], as well as between the average ratings for contradictions and ratings for (9) [ΔL=-0.10, 
ΔU=0.36, t(174)=-84.19, p<0.001]. (For all equivalence tests conducted in this paper, the lower t-
value, associated with the higher p-value, is reported). 
  
80.7% responded that (10) and (11) mean the same thing.8 The results showed that 
while (10) and (11) are thought of as mutually entailing, they are not universally treated as 
having the same meaning.  
A second experiment was also done with a new set of participants. Data were 
collected from 124 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk. This time, participants were 
given six sentences: (3), (4), (8), (9) and two sentences which are clearly non-contradictory. 
The order of the sentences was randomised. Instead of being asked whether or not the 
sentences make sense, they were asked whether the sentences are contradictions on the scale 
of 1-7 where ‘1’ means ‘This sentence is definitely not a contradiction’ and ‘7’ means ‘This 
sentence is definitely a contradiction’. Similar results were found: (3) (M=6.74, SD=1.10); (4) 
 
8 11.4% thought they don’t mean the same, of which 40% gave a rating of 7 to both (8) and (9). 5.7% 
were not sure; 2.3% gave their own responses. 
 (M=6.88, SD=0.59); (8) (M=6.80, SD=0.69); (9) (M=6.74, SD=0.74).9 Again, participants treated 
(8) and (9) just like contradictions.10  
If (8) is treated as a contradiction, i.e. (10) is thought of as entailing (11), then it’s no 
surprise that the pain-in-mouth argument seems invalid. The underlying reasoning of our 
judgment regarding the intuitive invalidity of the argument may be spelt out in the 
following way: if the premises of the argument entail the conclusion, i.e. (10), and (10) 
entails (11), then the premises should also entail (11). But they don’t, so the premises don’t 
entail the conclusion and the argument is invalid.   
The entailment account proposed here, although similar to some existing accounts 
in the literature, such as Noordhof’s account and the ‘paraphrase account’ mentioned by 
Hyman (2003) and Bain (2007), needs to be distinguished from them. According to the 
latter two proposals, (10) ought to be understood as (11). For Noordhof (2001, 2002), this is 
so because the relevant ‘in’ is non-spatial but used in state-attributing sense. For Hyman 
(2003: 16-7) and Bain (2007: 182), it is because (10) can be paraphrased as (11) without any 
loss of meaning. The entailment account is less committal. It does not claim that the ‘in’ of 
 
9 The two non-contradictory sentences were: ‘If today is Sunday, then yesterday was Saturday’; 
‘Tom’s bookshelf is full of books’. The average ratings for these two sentences were 1.15 (SD=0.87) 
and 1.05 (SD=0.31) respectively. 
10 The two one-sided sample tests (TOST) procedure showed statistical equivalence between the 
average ratings for contradictions and ratings for (8) [ΔL=-0.18, ΔU= 0.20, t(218)=-102.87, p<0.001], 
as well as between the average ratings for contradictions and ratings for (9) [ΔL=-0.13, ΔU= 0.27, 
t(218)=-98.88, p<0.001]. Participants were also asked whether (10) and (11) mean the same thing. 
This time, 86.3% responded affirmatively. 
 ‘pain in X’ is non-spatial.11 Nor is it committed to the idea that (10) and (11) have the same 
meaning, however meaning is conceived. It only claims that ordinary English speakers 
treat (10) as entailing (11), which is supported by empirical data.  
Philosophers have compared the pain-in-mouth argument with a number of other 
arguments which also seem invalid. Notably, Noordhof (2001) has compared it with ‘the 
hole-in-box argument’ – there is a hole in my shoe; the shoe is in the box; therefore, there 
is a hole in the box. Tye (1995) has compared it with invalid arguments involving 
propositional attitude verbs: Tom believes that he is in Vancouver; Vancouver is in Canada; 
therefore, Tom believes that he is in Canada. RSS have compared it, as we saw, with 
arguments involving tissue damage and inflammation. The entailment account provides 
an explanation as to why the pain-in-mouth argument seems intuitively invalid to us. An 
advocate of the account is not required to explain the intuitive failures of these other 
arguments. It could well be the case that different kinds of explanations should be given to 
account for the intuitive failures in these other arguments.12 
 
11 The claim that the ‘in’ of ‘pain in X’ is non-spatial but state-attributing is problematic (see also 
Hyman 2003; Reuter et al. 2019). There are clear examples of state-attributing uses of ‘in’ in English: 
in doubt, in love, etc. In these cases, ‘in’ is followed by a noun phrase which indicates a state. In the 
case of ‘in the fingertip/mouth’, the relevant noun phrases do not indicate states – fingertips and 
mouths are not states.  
12  With some of these arguments, it may be conjectured that locutions such as ‘there is an 
inflammation in my mouth’, ‘there is a hole in the box’, etc. are also intuitively thought of as 
entailing propositions that can be expressed in some predicative form: ‘my mouth is inflamed’, 
‘my shoe is perforated’, etc. which would explain why relevant arguments are also intuitively 
invalid. But this claim requires separate empirical testing. 
 4. Conclusion 
As we saw in this paper, the implicature account fails to explain the intuitive failure of the 
pain-in-mouth argument. In contrast, the entailment account offers a plausible and 
empirically-backed explanation. The argument seems invalid because the conclusion is 
naturally taken to entail that the speaker’s mouth hurts, which cannot be inferred from the 
premises. As it stands, this account makes no claims about where pains are located and is 
neutral between the mental and bodily conception of pain.  
 The entailment account is, however, in tension with the alleged possibility that one 
can have a pain in a body part without that body part hurting. In a number of places (e.g. 
Sytsma and Reuter 2017; Reuter and Sytsma 2018), Reuter and Sytsma have presented 
empirical evidence to show that ordinary English speakers are open to the possibility of 
unfelt pains or pains that don’t hurt.13 The evidence presented in this paper, in contrast, 
indicates that ordinary English speakers treat the utterance ‘there is a pain in my mouth, 
but my mouth doesn’t hurt’ as a contradiction, which suggests that they take pains to 
necessarily hurt.  
This tension between the two sets of evidence may plausibly reflect a tension in the 
(English) folk conception of pain. The overall situation seems to go some way in support 
of the recently proposed view of Borg et al. that the (English) folk conception of pain is 
polyeidic, that is, ‘containing a number of different strands or elements’, where ‘in different 
contexts different elements of the concept could be activated, enhanced or supressed’ (Borg 
et al. 2019). It may well be the case that what drives our intuitive judgement that the pain-
 
13 See Borg et al. (2019) for a review of the relevant experimental literature.  
 in-mouth argument is invalid is the thought that if there is a pain in X then X must hurt. But 
such a conception of pain may be suppressed in some contexts. It is possible that when 
considering hypothetical scenarios concerning a particular imaginary subject (who is, e.g. 
distracted, on pain killers, etc.) and being explicitly asked in the locative forms whether 
there is a pain in the subject’s body party or whether the subject has a pain (see Reuter and 
Sytsma 2018), participants might be triggered to focus on bodily damage and treat pains 
as concrete physical entities located in body parts, which in turn suppresses their 
conception of pains as necessarily hurt or felt. However, further study is required to 
understand the underlying factors that influence our judgements.14 
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